The Nesivos On Causing Unintentional Damage

Responsibility

By Rabbi Alexander London

BAVA KAMMA 27b

The Mishna states: If one places a jug in a public thoroughfare and another person stumbles over the jug and breaks it, that person is not liable to pay for the damage. If the person was damaged by the jug, the owner of the jug is liable for those damages.

The Gemara asks: Why is the person who stumbles over the jug and breaks it not liable for the damage? He should have watched where he was going!

Tosafos says that the Gemara did not ask, Why, if the person was damaged by the jug, is the owner of the jug liable for these damages? Here also, the fact that the person should have watched where he was going should absolve the owner of the jug from responsibility! Tosafos explains that there is a principle in Jewish law: One bears greater responsibility to ensure that he does not damage, than he does to ensure that he is not damaged.

The Nesivos (126:6) discusses a case where Reuven had deposited an article by Shimon. Reuven mistakenly told Shimon that the article actually belonged to Shimon. Shimon, forgetting that the object really belonged to Reuven, gave the object to a gentile. The Nesivos rules that Shimon must pay for the item. Although both Reuven and Shimon erred, Shimon bears responsibility. This is because of the principle that Tosafos stated: One bears greater responsibility to ensure that he does not damage, than he does to ensure that he is not damaged.

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Against Da’as Torah – Jewish Clericalism

ראוי להוראה וכו’: כגון מאן אמר רבא כגון שמעון בן עזאי ושמעון בן זומא א”ל אביי כי האי גוונא מזיד הוא ולטעמיך הא דתניא בעשותה אחת יחיד העושה מפי עצמו חייב בהוראת ב”ד פטור כיצד הורו ב”ד שחלב מותר ונודע לאחד מהן שטעו או תלמיד יושב לפניהן וראוי להוראה כגון שמעון בן עזאי יכול יהא פטור ת”ל בעשותה אחת יחיד העושה על פי עצמו חייב בהוראת ב”ד פטור אלא היכי משכחת לה כגון דידע דאסור וקא טעי במצוה לשמוע דברי חכמים לדידי נמי דטעו במצוה לשמוע דברי חכמים.

CAPABLE OF DECIDING MATTERS OF LAW etc. Like whom, for instance? — Raba replied: For instance, like Simeon b. Azzai and Simeon b. Zoma. Said Abaye to him: In the case of such [scholars] it would be a willful transgression! And according to your argument, [the other replied, how will you explain] the following wherein it was taught: ‘In doing one, [implies that if] an individual acts on his own authority he is liable; if under the authority of the ruling of the court, he is exonerated. How is this so? [In the case where] the court ruled that suet was permitted and it was known to one of then, or to a disciple sitting before them and capable of deciding matters of law, such for instance as Simeon b. ‘Azzai, that they erred, it might have been assumed that he is exonerated, hence it was expressly taught, in doing one, [implying that if] an individual acts on his own authority he is liable: if under the authority of the ruling of the court he is exonerated’? How then could this be possible? [Obviously] in such a case as where [the scholar] knew that it was prohibited, but erred in the [interpretation of the] precept of obeying the words of the Sages; according to my view also it is a case where they erred in the [interpretation of the] precept of obeying the words of the Sages.

Translation from Soncino, here.

  • Horiyos 2b

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משה פיגלין על תל אביב

“תל אביב זו עיר של הומואים ונשים חד הוריות, עיר שבה הגבריות לא לגיטימית. אם אתה גבר סטרייט בתל אביב, אתה מרגיש כמעט צורך להתנצל. לא סתם מובילי המחאה החברתית – סתיו שפיר ודפני ליף – הן נשים.

תל אביב היא הסמל להתערערות מוסד המשפחה בישראל. גדל בתל אביב דור חולה של ילדים לנשים חד הוריות. אין להם אבא, אז הם חושבים שביבי אבא שלהם ודורשים ממנו לחם ועבודה.”

~ (מקור)

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