Real History: The ‘Civilized’ State APED Non-State Civilization

The search for ‘early civilisation’ in ancient societies has obscured the diverse ways in which ancient societies survived and thrived.

The task I’ve set myself here is to think about the history of civilisation before the state. Why should this be so difficult? And why is it nevertheless a task worth pursuing? The answers lie partly in a set of widespread assumptions about what constitutes a civilisation in world history. It is common, for example, to group a whole series of ancient societies together under the banner of ‘early civilisation’. The ones that usually get included are ancient Mesopotamia, ancient Egypt, the Classic Maya, the Aztecs, Shang China, the Inca Empire and the Yoruba kingdoms of West Africa. But when it comes to defining what these particular societies have in common, the concept of civilisation seems to drop out of the equation. Suddenly the focus shifts, without explanation, to other factors that can be easily described without any use of the term civilisation – factors such as class stratification, urbanisation, centralised (and often literate) administration, sacred kingship, economic exploitation of the many by the few and so on. ‘Civilisation’, by this point, has simply become an umbrella term for a whole cluster of other cultural attributes that are basically to do with the effective exercise of power by a small and determined elite. In other words, ‘early civilisation’ and ‘state formation’ have become indistinguishable from one another as historical and descriptive categories.

Sensing the trap of a circular argument, some anthropologists have tried, albeit tentatively, to separate these two things out. For instance, in cases of early civilisations that are made up of politically independent city-states – such as the Classical Maya or ancient Mesopotamia – the term ‘civilisation’ is sometimes used to refer to the shared cultural and cosmological milieu within which multiple states exist: a kind of overarching set of guidelines about the proper moral relationships among mortals, kings and gods that encompasses the strategic rivalries of political factions. Yet the more fundamental equation between state and civilisation as coeval stages of social development stands largely unquestioned. This might be defensible were it possible to argue that only the power of centralised states is capable of generating such large-scale patterns of cultural uniformity and moral consensus. But as we shall see, this is very far from being the case.

Also largely unquestioned are the wider historical implications of a term such as ‘early civilisation’, which must then imply that there is also such as a thing as ‘late’ or ‘developed’ civilisation. Where then would we locate the transition from one to the other? Was medieval Europe – with its sacred kingdoms and administrative elites – an early or a late civilisation? Have we, in fact, until very recently – say, until the political revolutions of the eighteenth to twentieth centuries – been living under social and political conditions that are basically analogous to those of ancient Egypt or Mesopotamia? How different in structure were the ‘old regimes’ of Europe from what are sometimes described as ‘archaic states’ or ‘early civilisations’? Fencing off early civilisation as a distinct stage in human history can quickly become an arbitrary and subjective affair.

No less arbitrary, it seems, are the initial criteria on which current definitions of ‘early civilisation’ are grounded. Urbanism, for instance, was sometimes characteristic of societies that actually exhibit very little evidence for pronounced class stratification. To continue describing the appearance of 250-hectare settlements in fourth millennium BC Mesopotamia as an ‘urban revolution’ begins to look a little strange when we realise that, during the same period, the prehistoric societies of Eastern Europe – from the Carpathian Mountains to the Dniepr River – were forming settlements of over 400 hectares. The Ukrainian site of Talianki, for instance, is thought to have held something in the order of 10,000 inhabitants. What is so striking about these earliest European cities is that they achieved such immense sizes with no apparent need for centralised government, bureaucracy or a political elite. And their ground plans – forming concentric rings of similarly designed households – suggest a robustly egalitarian ethos. Yet they are usually excluded from the roster of ‘early civilisations’ and their (potentially enormous) implications for how we understand the root causes of social inequality go largely unrecognised. Studies of human political evolution seem to remain, for the most part, oblivious to the whole phenomenon and happily continue to assume that urban egalitarianism was something confined to a very brief period of mid-twentieth-century Catalonian history.

Similar points could be made about bureaucracy. Although often included as a key component within the list of attributes shared by ‘early civilisation’, complex administration in fact turns out to predate the emergence of cities and kingship by thousands of years. In Upper Mesopotamia – what is now inland Syria and northern Iraq – there is clear evidence for the use of complex bureaucratic devices, such as commodity seals and economic archives, in small-scale farming communities as far back as the 7th millennium BC. Why such devices were adopted in what must essentially have been face-to-face societies remains something of a mystery. And, again, the writers of general sourcebooks on world history seem largely content to ignore the facts and continue to describe specialised administration as a distinct evolutionary feature of urban civilisations.

It is worth adding at this point that the invention of the first writing systems was – in many parts of the world – a gradual development from these much earlier systems of bureaucratic notation, rather than a revolutionary innovation. This is perhaps most clearly evident in the case of Mesopotamian cuneiform, which has been shown to evolve from systems of numerical representation that can be traced back – on at least one interpretation – almost to the origins of farming itself.

What, then, about class or caste distinctions and other forms of social inequality? Can these be more legitimately regarded as defining criteria of ‘early civilisation’? Surely not, since archaeologists have carefully traced clear and pronounced evidence of status differentiation back to the period of Palaeolithic hunter-gatherers, long before the origins of sedentary life, let alone cities or literacy. Consider, for example, the exceptionally preserved site of Sungir in Russia, which offers striking evidence for the concentration of material wealth – prestigious weapons and thousands of finely worked body ornaments – within the burials of a middle-aged man and two children; or, indeed, the monumental stone temples of Göbekli Tepe in southern Turkey, built over 10,000 years ago by hunter-gatherers, who were contemporaries and neighbours of the first farmers in the Fertile Crescent.

Deducing the political structures of prehistoric societies from their material remains is no simple task. But at the very least, such dramatic findings should lead us to question the persistence – even in quite specialised literature – of a Rousseau-like vision of the childhood of man, in which hunter-gatherer societies are still portrayed as invariably small and essentially egalitarian bands. It is worth noting in this context that, when disturbingly hierarchical features are found among hunter-gatherer societies, the tendency has been to compare them with the playing out of dominance hierarchies among chimpanzees and other higher primates, as opposed to viewing them in the perspective of other types of human political systems, such as those of early states and ‘civilisations’. The implication, whether or not the authors of such views realise it, seems to be either that hunter-gatherers are in some sense closer to chimpanzees than they are to other human beings, or that politicians as a distinct social class have more in common with chimpanzees than they do with most other human beings. I personally find the latter interpretation to be the more plausible. At a more general level, we might also ask why some people find it necessary – even in the face of contradictory evidence – to equate ‘civilisation’ with the growth of authoritarian, agro-industrial states? What is really at stake here?

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From Engelsberg Ideas, here.

Helpful Glossary: Explaining Media Term-of-Art ‘Russian Disinformation’

New Proof Emerges of the Biden Family Emails: a Definitive Account of the CIA/Media/BigTech Fraud

An axis of the CIA, Big Tech and the DNC-allied wing of the corporate media spread an absolute lie in the weeks before the 2020 election. We now have definitive proof.

A severe escalation of the war on a free internet and free discourse has taken place over the last twelve months. Numerous examples of brute and dangerous censorship have emerged: the destruction by Big Tech monopolies of Parler at the behest of Democratic politicians at the time that it was the most-downloaded app in the country; the banning of the sitting president from social media; and the increasingly explicit threats from elected officials in the majority party of legal and regulatory reprisals in the event that tech platforms do not censor more in accordance with their demands.

But the most severe episode of all was the joint campaign — in the weeks before the 2020 election — by the CIA, Big Tech, the liberal wing of the corporate media and the Democratic Party to censor and suppress a series of major reports about then-presidential frontrunner Joe Biden. On October 14 and then October 15, 2020, The New York Post, the nation’s oldest newspaper, published two news reports on Joe Biden’s activities in Ukraine and China that raised serious questions about his integrity and ethics: specifically whether he and his family were trading on his name and influence to generate profit for themselves. The Post said that the documents were obtained from a laptop left by Joe Biden’s son Hunter at a repair shop.

From the start, the evidence of authenticity was overwhelming. The Post published obviously genuine photos of Hunter that were taken from the laptop. Investigations from media outlets found people who had received the emails in real-time and they compared the emails in their possession to the ones in the Post‘s archive, and they matched word-for-word. One of Hunter’s own business associates involved in many of these deals, Tony Bobulinski, confirmed publicly and in interviews that the key emails were genuine and that they referenced Joe Biden’s profit participation in one deal being pursued in China. A forensics analyst issued a report concluding the archive had all the earmarks of authenticity. Not even the Bidens denied that the emails were real: something they of course would have done if they had been forged or altered. In sum, as someone who has reported on numerous large archives similar to this one and was faced with the heavy burden of ensuring the documents were genuine before risking one’s career and reputation by reporting them, it was clear early on that all the key metrics demonstrated that these documents were real.

Despite all that, former intelligence officials such as Obama’s CIA Director John Brennan and his Director of National Intelligence James Clapper led a group of dozens of former spooks in issuing a public statement that disseminated an outright lie: namely, that the laptop was “Russian disinformation.” Note that this phrase contains two separate assertions: 1) the documents came from Russia and 2) they are fake (“disinformation”). The intelligence officials admitted in this letter that — in their words — “we do not know if the emails are genuine or not,” and also admitted that “we do not have evidence of Russian involvement.” Yet it repeatedly insinuated that everyone should nonetheless believe this:

Letter from 60 former intelligence officials about the New York Post reporting, Oct. 19, 2020

But the complete lack of evidence for these claims — that even these career CIA liars acknowledged plagued their assertions — did not stop the corporate media or Big Tech from repeating this lie over and over, and, far worse, using this lie to censor this reporting from the internetOne of the first to spread this lie was the co-queen of Russiagate frauds, Natasha Bertrand, then of Politico and now promoted, because of lies like this, to CNN. “Hunter Biden story is Russian disinfo, dozens of former intel officials say,” blared her headline in Politico on October 19, just five days after the Post began its reporting. From there, virtually every media outlet — CNN, NBC News, PBS, Huffington PostThe Intercept, and too many others to count — began completely ignoring the substance of the reporting and instead spread the lie over and over that these documents were the by-product of Russian disinformation.

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From Glenn Greenwald, here.

המאמר הבא יכול להציל אתכם מעשר טעויות נפוצות

שגיעוט קטיב שכולנו נופלים בהן: מה זה ‘חרף’? מה זה ‘למצער’? האם המילה ‘בכדי’ תקנית? אומרים ‘איננה’ או ‘אינה’? ‘לולי’ או לולא’? אחת ולתמיד מתקנים את השגיאות!

היי כולם!

המאמר הבא לא נועד להפוך אתכם לדודה הטרחנית שמתקנת את כולם, אבל כן יכול להציל אתכם מעשר טעויות ממש נפוצות, שיוציאו אתכם לא טוב.

אם אתם עובדים על כתיבת ספר משלכם, בין אם זה ספר ראשון או ספר רביעי, בטח נתקלתם במהלך הכתיבה, הגהה לספרים ו/או עריכת הטקסט בשאלות שקשורות לדקדוק ולשון.

גם אם לא, יש שגיאות כתיב נפוצות שכדאי להכיר, גם בשביל הוצאת ספר אך גם בשביל התכתבות סתמית עם חברים.

עכשיו, חשוב להדגיש – זה לא שאנחנו לא טועים בחיים (מבטיחים שתצליחו למצוא טעויות כתיב ולשון, גם בפוסטים שלנו כאן באתר), אבל משתדלים, וזה בסדר לטעות. כולנו בני אנוש…

שגיאה מס’ 1 | מכסימום או מקסימום?

האם נכון לכתוב מכסיקו או מקסיקו? אכסיומה או אקסיומה? פרדוכס או פרדוקס?

בעבר נהגו להמיר את האותיות K או X (ולעתים בראש מילה) בכתיבה אנגלית או לועזית, לאות כ’ דגושה בעברית, אך ההנחיה המעודכנת של האקדמיה ללשון היא להמירה דווקא באות ק’.

אמרו מעתה: מקסימום, טקסט, טקסטיל, אורתודוקסי, קומפלקס, אקסיומה, טקס, פרדוקס, רפלקס, מקסיקו, אנגלוסקסי וכן על זה הדרך.

אבל, שימו לב – יש גם חריגים!

כיון שבעבר נהגו להמיר בכ’ דגושה, מילים ושמות שכתיבתן הושרשה בצורה זו לא השתנו, ותקין לכותבן עם כ’ ולא עם ק’.

לדוגמא: אלכסנדר, כריסטיאנו, כורדיסטן ועוד.

שגיאה מס’ 2 | אומרים ‘איננה’ או ‘אינה’ יכולה?

שגיאה מצויה נוספת היא בשאלה האם נכון לכתוב “שושי איננה כאן”, או “שושי אינה כאן”. השאלה רלוונטית כמובן גם ללשון זכר, “משה איננו כאן – או אינו כאן”.

אז מה מבין האופציות זו שגיאה? ובכן מתברר שלא זה ולא זה! (תודו שלא ידעתם עד הרגע, או שאתם מ-מ-ש טובים!)

ההבדל בין צורות ההתבטאות תלוי באיזו תקופה היסטורית אנו נתלים.

  • איננו – לשון המקרא (“…וְהַסְּנֶה אֵינֶנּוּ אֻכָּל”)
  • אינו – לשון חז”ל (“מִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ מַנִּיחַ אֶת הָעֲנִיִּים לִלְקֹט…”)

בתכל’ס, כשכותבים בעברית בת ימינו – שתי צורות ההתבטאות נכונות, אז גם אם לא עודכנתם בזה – יצאתם בסדר (בסעיף הזה… לא לעוף).

אגב יש עוד הרבה מילים שמשתנות לפי ההבדל הזה (המקרא ראשון):

  • אנחנו / אנו
  • זאת / זו
  • אלה / אלו
  • איך / כיצד
  • פה / כאן
  • איפה / היכן 

שגיאה מס’ 3 | ארעי או עראי?

קבלו סתם מילה מהסוג המבלבל; המצב הנוכחי הוא ארעי, סליחה, עראי, לא, רגע…

ובכן, המילה ‘עראי’ קבילה רק בספרות תורנית, ובעברית זה תמיד ארעי. המצב ארעי, הבניין ארעי.

בספרות תורנית המילה ‘עראי’ היא תיאור מצב נתון. לעומת ארעי שזה שם תואר.

המשך לקרוא…

מאתר טקסט רץ, כאן.

Afghanistan: From Now on We Can Ignore ‘Political Science’!

Tetlock and the Taliban

How a humiliating military loss proves that so much of our so-called “expertise” is fake, and the case against specialization and intellectual diversity

Note: Apologies to Phil Tetlock if he doesn’t want to be associated with the Taliban, I just couldn’t resist the alliteration. Also apologies to the Taliban if they don’t want to be associated with an American academic, though I assure them that Phil is one of the good ones.

Imagine that the US was competing in a space race with some third world country, say Zambia, for whatever reason. Americans of course would have orders of magnitude more money to throw at the problem, and the most respected aerospace engineers in the world, with degrees from the best universities and publications in the top journals. Zambia would have none of this. What should our reaction be if, after a decade, Zambia had made more progress?

Obviously, it would call into question the entire field of aerospace engineering. What good were all those Google Scholar pages filled with thousands of citations, all the knowledge gained from our labs and universities, if Western science gets outcompeted by the third world?

For all that has been said about Afghanistan, no one has noticed that this is precisely what just happened to political science. The American-led coalition had countless experts with backgrounds pertaining to every part of the mission on their side: people who had done their dissertations on topics like state building, terrorism, military-civilian relations, and gender in the military. General David Petraeus, who helped sell Obama on the troop surge that made everything in Afghanistan worse, earned a PhD from Princeton and was supposedly an expert in “counterinsurgency theory.” Ashraf Ghani, the just deposed president of the country, has a PhD in anthropology from Columbia and is the co-author of a book literally called Fixing Failed States. This was his territory. It’s as if Wernher von Braun had been given all the resources in the world to run a space program and had been beaten to the moon by an African witch doctor.

Meanwhile, the Taliban did not have a Western PhD among them. Their leadership was highly selected though. As Ahmed Rashid notes in his book The Taliban, in February 1999, the school that provided the leadership for the movement “had a staggering 15,000 applicants for some 400 new places making it the most popular madrassa in northern Pakistan.” Yet they certainly didn’t publish in or read the top political science journals. Consider this a data point in the question of whether intelligence or subject-matter expertise is more important.

Is the moon shot analogy fair? I think it probably strikes many people as odd, but I don’t see why it should. Surely, there were many political scientists who thought what the US was trying to do in Afghanistan given the resources invested was impossible, me among them, and maybe it’s simply the “experts” who were hired by NGOs, think tanks, and the US government that were delusional.

Yet I wonder what the field of civil engineering would say if the US went abroad and tried to build bridges based on principles that violated the laws of physics. I’d like to think the Pentagon would have trouble finding well-credentialed experts to help them, and those that did take a paycheck to help achieve the impossible would lose all credibility in their field. That of course has not happened to the pundits and social scientists who spent 20 years making a living off the idea that the US was doing something reasonable in Afghanistan.

Tetlock’s Discovery

Phil Tetlock’s work on experts is one of those things that gets a lot of attention, but still manages to be underrated. In his 2005 Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?, he found that the forecasting abilities of subject-matter experts were no better than educated laymen when it came to predicting geopolitical events and economic outcomes. As Bryan Caplan points out, we shouldn’t exaggerate the results here and provide too much fodder for populists; the questions asked were chosen for their difficulty, and the experts were being compared to laymen who nonetheless had met some threshold of education and competence.

At the same time, we shouldn’t put too little emphasis on the results either. They show that “expertise” as we understand it is largely fake. Should you listen to epidemiologists or economists when it comes to COVID-19? Conventional wisdom says “trust the experts.” The lesson of Tetlock (and the Afghanistan War), is that while you certainly shouldn’t be getting all your information from your uncle’s Facebook Wall, there is no reason to start with a strong prior that people with medical degrees know more than any intelligent person who honestly looks at the available data.

I have a PhD in political science with a focus on international relations. Most people in my position would tell you that you should give my opinions on my topic of expertise more weight because of my credentials. I believe if anything, you should hold my degree against me, as getting a PhD is probably the most inefficient way to understand a topic, and a person seeking that credential has shown that they don’t understand that. I think I’ve been right on Afghanistan and other American interventions because of good intellectual habits, including a genuine concern with what is true. But that has little to do with any training I got from political science.

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From Richard Hanania’s Newsletter, here.