העורך Editor

One cannot override Hashem’s plan, but one may certainly be punished for trying.

Gemara Sotah 9a, end – 9b:

תנו רבנן סוטה נתנה עיניה במי שאינו ראוי לה מה שביקשה לא ניתן לה ומה שבידה נטלוהו ממנה שכל הנותן עיניו במה שאינו שלו מה שמבקש אין נותנין לו ומה שבידו נוטלין הימנו

וכן מצינו בנחש הקדמוני שנתן עיניו במה שאינו ראוי לו מה שביקש לא נתנו לו ומה שבידו נטלוהו ממנו

וכן מצינו בקין וקרח ובלעם ודואג ואחיתופל וגחזי ואבשלום ואדוניהו ועוזיהו והמן שנתנו עיניהם במה שאינו ראוי להם מה שביקשו לא ניתן להם ומה שבידם נטלוהו מהם.

Soncino’s translation:

Our Rabbis have taught: The guilty Sotah set her eyes on one who was not proper for her; what she sought was not given to her (She is not allowed to marry her lover) and what she possessed was taken from her; (She dies if she drinks the water, and is divorced with loss of her settlement if she confesses) because whoever sets his eyes on that which is not his is not granted what he seeks and what he possesses is taken from him.

We thus find it with the primeval serpent [in the Garden of Eden] which set its eyes on that which was not proper for it; what it sought was not granted to it and what it possessed was taken from it. The Holy One, blessed be He, said: I declared: Let it be king over every animal and beast; but now, Cursed art thou above all cattle and above every beast of the field. I declared, let it walk with an erect posture; but now it shall go upon its belly. I declared: Let its food be the same as that of man; but now it shall eat dust. It said: I will kill Adam and marry Eve; but now, I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed. Similarly do we find it with Cain, Korah, Balaam, Doeg, Ahitophel, Gehazi, Absalom, Adonijah, Uzziah and Haman, who set their eyes upon that which was not proper for them; what they sought was not granted to them and what they possessed was taken from them.

“ויברך אותם משה”.

א”ל ה’ אלקי אבותיכם יוסף וגו’ (תו”כ שמיני פ”א) וי”א ויהי נועם וגו’ (במדב”ר פי”ב) וי”א יהי רצון שתשרה שכינה במעשה ידיכם (ס”ע פ”ו ותו”כ הנ”ל) וי”א יה”ר שלא תשלוט בכם עין רע ולא אויב במעשה ידיכם (מדרש אגדה) וי”א ברכת כהנים (ס”ח סי’ תתרכ”א) וי”א כשם שנתעסקתם במלאכת משכן ושרתה שכינה על מעשה ידיכם כך תזכו ותבנו לפניו בית הבחירה ותשרה שכינה על מעשה ידיכם (תוספתא מנחות פ”ז וסע”ר פ”ו ע”ש).

מתוך “למכסה עתיק” של הרב חיים קניבסקי

An excerpt here:

I saw a great deal of checklisting in my career. For example, when the prison department grew alarmed at the number of suicides in prison, or perhaps I should say at the publicity being given to the number of suicides in prison, it developed a form that in effect was a checklist, to be applied to any prisoner thought to be in the least suicidal or likely to attempt suicide (not quite the same thing).

The purpose of this form, I soon discovered, was not so much to prevent suicide as to prevent criticism after the suicide had taken place: For if the form had been filled correctly, it was possible to argue that all that could have been done to prevent it was in fact done. This kind of magical thinking was accepted more or less wholesale by the courts investigating the suicides of prisoners.

 In fact, the form was even more cunningly designed than this suggests. It was of such complexity that it was almost impossible to fill it in correctly, or at least sufficiently. So that if blame had to be apportioned, which is to say if negligence had been incontestable, it could be apportioned to the last person who had not filled his little bit of the form properly. It could then be claimed that, but for this omission, the suicide would not have happened; and the chief glory of the form was that the failure to fill it adequately was almost always by someone very lowly in the hierarchy.

An excerpt:

The Rishonim in Nedarim (28) distinguish between dina d’malchusa, fair laws that are necessary for good governance, and dina d’malka, arbitrary laws decreed by whim of the ruler. Halacha demands that we respect the former, but shows no recognition of the latter. A theoretical question: when the President withholds necessary anti-terror funds from a city, endangering the entire population, as an act of retribution against a Senator from his own party who dared cross him, are we dealing with dina d’malka or dina d’malchusa?  Or when the Attorney General threatens to prosecute those who engage in “anti-Muslim speech” but  makes no move to bring charges against a Secretary of State who kept top secret data on an unsecure mail server in a bathroom, are the laws of the land being enforced dina d’malka or dina d’malchusa? I can give plenty more examples, but you get the idea.  Just wondering at what point we’ve crossed the line.

I prefer his second example.

From Divrei Chaim, here.

Rabbi Elazar said, “Whoever divorces his first wife, even the Altar sheds tears for him.” After the mishna on amud alef teaches the rulings of Beit Shammai, Beit Hillel and Rabbi Akiva regarding what constitutes “grounds for divorce”, based on how to interpret the verse in the Chumash regarding an acceptable reason to permit divorce (Duet. 24:1), Rabbi Elazer cites an additional source that discourages divorce if at all possible. He quotes a prophecy of Malachi, “And this second thing you do, to cover the Altar of the G-d with tears, weeping, and sighing, such that He will no longer turn to the offering, nor will He take anything willingly from your hand. And you will say, ‘Why?’ Because the G-d testified between you and the wife of your youth, that you dealt treacherously with her, and she is your companion and the wife of your covenant.” (Malachi 2:13-14)

Based on these verses Rabbi Elazar teaches, “Whoever divorces his first wife, even the Altar sheds tears for him.” This may sound like merely a poignant idea but not a legal issue, especially since nowadays we are without merit of having a Beit Hamikdash with an actual Altar. However, his teaching is in fact cited as halacha in the Shulchan Aruch, Even Ha’Ezer 119:3. The Rema cites Rabbi Elazar’s teaching as reason to forbid divorce even in a situation where it is permitted, providing the wife was not unfaithful (in which case it would be a mitzvah to divorce), or unless the woman also wants to divorce. The Mechaber states that one should “not hurry” to divorce (unless required by halacha), based on this same teaching of Rabbi Elazar.

An excerpt from Ohr.edu, here.