Ron Paul: America Won’t Have a Reasonable Foreign Policy Until After the Collapse

How Far Can the Americans Be Pushed?

Inspired by the Saker’s article regarding how far can the Russians be pushed, I ask, how far can the Americans be pushed, not specifically only in Syria, but in general?

In his article, the Saker articulated in his regular rational and captivating style, the issue of Russian patience, or should we say frustration, with America’s actions and inactions in Syria. And, as I was reading the article, I began to think about looking at the situation from the other side of the mirror in a tongue-in-cheek manner; looking at it from the American perspective.

I thought back to an article I had written on the very same theme some years ago, focusing and predicting on what a desperate America would do.

The sad and ironic reality is that America does not walk the talk of competitiveness and level playing fields. America’s definition of a national threat is different from that of any other country in human history; except perhaps for ancient Rome.

For this reason, America does not believe that Russia has been pushed at all, but quite the contrary. America believes that is America that has been pushed; by not only Russia, but by many other nations. As a matter of fact, I started writing this article and I wasn’t going to finish it and submit it until President Putin pushed America even further towards the state of panic in his 1st of March speech.

American politicians operate on the pretext that America has a given right to be the greatest, wealthiest, most-developed, strongest unrivaled nation on earth.

Given its history and post WWII successes of being able to lure in the best brains of the world; not only from Germany, but the rest of the world, America believed that the homeland of any eminent scientist should be America.

Furthermore, with the multitude of defections from the USSR, not only Russian scientists were welcomed into America, but also musicians, scholars, athletes and other people of exceptional talents and capabilities.

And this list goes on, because Germany and Russia were not the only nations that exported excellence to America, but the whole world did, and perhaps for good reasons, because from the 1950’s onwards, everybody wanted to live in America; and many pop culture songs have recorded this phenomenon.

In little time, the best of the best in Europe and the rest of the world ended up in America. Not too many want to be reminded that that Wernher von Braun, the “American” rocket scientist who designed the Apollo program rockets, was a former Nazi, the same von Braun who designed the rockets that hit London in 1945.The prime reasons for his exodus and that of others, were poor living conditions, political persecution among other reasons. So if America managed to lure them in and find a way to capitalize on their great talents, then America has well and truly deserved the spoils of their genius.

But Trump’s America, even Obama’s, Bush’s and Clinton’s is not exactly that global brain and talent pivot any longer. As a result, America has changed the rules of the game in order to stay on top.

But this went further, according to the American way of looking at the rest of the world. During the Cold War, members of the former Warsaw Pact were considered as enemy states together with all other states affiliated with the USSR such as Cuba, Syria, Egypt and Angola, just to name a few. After the downfall of the USSR and the virtual elimination of serious adversaries, America “had to invent” new enemies. The post “Cold War” definition of an enemy morphed into classifying nations as members of the “Axis of Evil” if they did not kowtow to Washington’s definition of the so-called “New World Order”.

But as America grows weaker, financially, technologically, and even militarily, and as the world is beginning to look to China and Russia for the latest technology instead of America, for as long as America is able to stretch the definition of what constitutes a national threat, and for as long as the rest of the West will buy this definition, it will continue to do this.

Having lost its competitive edge and not yet being able to admit it, America is still desperately trying to cling to this edge by means that contradict with its stature as the leader of the free world and the nation that it alleges to be.

To this effect, and for America to be able to hold on to its leading position, it can no longer do this from any semblance of a position of fairness and real and honest competition. This is why America is now upscaling its enemy definition and resorting to what can be best seen as bullying tactics; thereby taking unfair advantage of other nations.

According to those new rules, now that they no longer can conceal or sugarcoat its true intentions, any nation that tries to develop itself is seen by America as a potential threat. And this applies to all aspects of development, because according to America, no other nation is allowed to be better or even close to where America is.

If America cannot compete against athletes of other nations, it will ban them.

If America cannot be trade competitive, it will impose sanctions on its competitors.

If America sees that a nation does not fully kowtow to its agenda, it will classify it as a terrorist state and tries to push it to its knees by putting a ban on international trade with it.

When the economy fails and America cannot generate wealth, REAL WEALTH, to stay on the top, it will print money.

And when American citizens turn into whistle-blowers, they are branded as traitors. So much for free speech. And where did Edward Snowden seek political asylum? In Russia out of all places. Will we in the future see a reversal of the former exodus of citizens of the USSR to the USA? We cannot say this can be ruled out.

One therefore does not have to be Kim Jong Un, sitting on a nuclear arsenal with a button in his hand threatening to hit American cities with, to be seen as a threat to America. Any person or any state touted to out-perform Americans or America now or in the future, in any field of endeavour, is considered by the American policy makers as a threat. But even speaking of Kim Jong Un, the question of whether or not his stand is offensive or defensive is quite diabolical. North Korea saw what happened to Vietnam, Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan. Most importantly, North Korea has not forgotten what happened to Korea itself. How can any rationally-minded person blame North Korea for developing nukes; if the sole intention is to stave off another American onslaught?

Back to the main subject. To put this into perspective, when America sees that anti-Russian sanctions are not working and that in fact the global Russian influence is getting stronger, when it sees Russia is in Syria making things happen, it feels threatened.

When it sees Russian state-of-the-art weaponry and electronic jamming devices in action, when it sees China building a huge fleet with two aircraft carriers and counting, when it sees Russia and China way ahead, each developing their own hypersonic, even orbital, fighter jets,  which America itself does not yet have, when it realizes that it has to use Russian-made rockets to propel its satellites into space, when America knows that for all practical purposes, America is no longer the world’s strongest economy, then America feels that it has been pushed to the absolute limit that only further sanctions and war can remedy.

The 1st of March 2018 Putin speech will in the future be seen as a turning point. Even though President Putin did not mention electronic jamming devices and other Russian military technology that America is well and truly behind in, he will be seen in history as the first ever non-American leader to put American military on notice by saying to American policy makers that Russia is militarily more advanced than America in both defense and attack.

And if America brags its unrivaled huge fleet, the new technology Russia has developed has the potential to turn American naval vessels into ancient and expensive sitting, or should I say floating, ducks waiting to be sunk.

In retrospect, ancient Rome saw in rivaling Carthage an existential threat until the Romans pillaged Carthage killing every single man woman and child. We cannot expect annihilation of this magnitude in the time and age, or can we? Having said that, America’s nuclear power is a huge force to be reckoned with, and to expect America to accept second or third grade world status, without a bang, is no more than wishful thinking. But how useful and effective is this power?

In his recent interview with Sputnik, Ron Paul doubts that America will ever have a reasonable foreign policy, and argues that the fall of America will be financial, like other empires in the past, and that someday America will go broke and no longer be able to continue to run the world.

To put it bluntly, after the petro-dollar loses its world dominance, and this doesn’t seem very far away, a time will come when it will become virtually impossible to keep propping up the American economy with quantitative easing (aka printing money). And as America loses its economic stature, its only remaining prowess and might will be in its nuclear arsenal. The question is this. If America is imposing sanctions and bans right left and centre right now, and for no good reason at all, will a much more desperate America use its nuclear power to restore its dominion? Lately, America has been considering diluting its restrictions on the use of nuclear power by developing “more usable” nukes.

Continue reading…

From LewRockwell.com, here.

Tomer Devorah Rams Chassidus, Scrapes Eliezer Berland en Passant

The Cult of Personality

7 Adar 5778

Today is both the birthday and the yahrtzeit of the holiest and most humble man who ever lived – Moshe Rabeinu. This status is attested to by the very fact that no cult of personality ever developed around him. Baruch Hashem! HKB”H saw to that. Nothing would have grieved him more.

The most extreme examples of the cult of personality are, of course, Christianity and Islam, which became world religions built around the figures of Yeshu and Mohammed.

Unfortunately for us, we see quite a lot of this sort of thing in the Jewish world today. The lower the generation goes, the more cults seem to develop, r”l. The most well-known and visible examples of this in Judaism today are Chabad and Breslov. It would seem that Hasidism is particularly prone to developing cults of personality. But, perhaps that is because it started out as such, centered as it was around the person and teachings of the Ba’al Shem Tov.

That is not at all to say that there are not good and valuable lessons to be learned from the Besht or other Hasidic teachers, but one must be aware and on guard against the negative side of it as well.

The Besht also taught that the Tzaddik (the religious leader of the Hasidim) should serve as a model of how to lead a religious life. However, he did not emphasize the doctrine of the Tzaddik nearly as much as some of his successors, particularly Dov Baer of Mezrich, who made it central to Hasidism. Dov Baer, the leader of the Hasidim after the Baal Shem Tov’s death, taught that God revealed Himself through the Tzaddik’s most trivial actions; one of Dov Baer’s followers said, “I didn’t go to him to learn Torah, but to see him unbuckle his shoes.” Dov Baer taught that the ideal Tzaddik had a closer relationship to God than the average Jew, and could bestow blessings on people. In return, it was understood that the Hasidim must bring their Tzaddik gifts.

The belief in the power and greatness of the Tzaddik became one of Hasidism’s strongest-and most controversial-ideas. Hasidism’s opponents charged that the Tzaddikim (plural) often enriched themselves at the expense of their followers. In the generation after Dov Baer, numerous new Hasidic groups were formed, each with its own Tzaddik, referred to as a rebbe. These rebbes became a kind of Jewish royalty. When one died, he was succeeded by either his son or son-­in-­law. Those Hasidic groups that established eminent family dynasties became successful. Many Hasidic groups, however, went into decline when their rebbe died and left behind less capable successors.  (Source)

Hasidism only developed in the mid-18th century and was bitterly opposed by many of their fellow Jews from its inception, including leaders of the generation like the Vilna Gaon. The Hasids themselves came up with the term Mitnagdim(opposers) to describe those who objected to the new and controversial movement.

The first communal opposition to the Hasidic movement came from the Jewish community of Shklov in Belorussia during the winter of 1772.Rabbis and communal leaders communicated their concerns about the alleged heresies of the Hasidim, who were making rapid inroads into Belorussia, to the renowned Vilna Gaon, Eliyahu ben Shelomoh Zalman. Although some scholars differ, a majority agree that it was the Gaon who in turn galvanized the leading Jewish communities of Lithuania and Belorussia, such as Vilna, Brisk, and Minsk—in addition to Brody in Galicia—into a major battle with Hasidism. This battle was initially engaged through rabbinical letters of excommunication forbidding the establishment of Hasidic prayer houses, ordering the public burning of Hasidic literature, encouraging the humiliation and even imprisonment of Hasidic leaders, and banning contact with them or their followers.

…A public letter from the Jewish community of Vilna, bearing the signature of the Vilna Gaon, is the first document included in Zemir ‘aritsim ve-ḥarvot tsurim. It appeared shortly after the Passover festival of 1772, and accused Hasidim of a variety of religious offenses, focusing in particular on the allegedly phony and supercilious nature of their displays of piety—characterized by ecstatic prayers, recited in unsanctioned, breakaway synagogues, that included twirls and somersaults—along with their dancing, smoking, and drinking. Generally, the ban that was the subject of this letter condemned what was deemed as the Hasidim’s inappropriate, irreverently joyful demeanor in the service of God and their disregard for Torah study and disrespect for rabbinical scholars. All this stood in sharp contrast to the ascetic, dour, and severely scholarly demeanor of the Gaon and his disciples. The main reason that Hasidism ultimately made far fewer inroads into northeastern Europe—western and northern Lithuania in particular—was the enormous and enduring influence of the Vilna Gaon in that region, and the attribution to him of the fiercest opposition to the new movement.

The death of the Gaon in 1797 and the decision of the tsarist government in 1804 to legalize Hasidic prayer houses and severely restrict the anti-Hasidic measures of the Misnagdim had the combined effect of dashing the Misnagdim’s dreams of utterly destroying Hasidism. These setbacks initially led to even more vitriolic anti-Hasidic sentiments in the polemical literature, however, along with harsher, at times desperate, Misnagdic communal measures that continued well into the nineteenth century, both in Eastern Europe and in Palestine. (Source)

If you find yourself uncomfortable with much of Hasidic teaching or practice, you are not without a prominent leg to stand on. But, the best proof of my contention that it is based primarily on the cult of personality is the fact that no one is allowed to question any aspect of the movement and no criticism is allowed. To even suggest that one is opposed to anything about it results in being utterly and completely cut off with no further contact.

What is happening now with regard to Breslov Rabbi Eliezer Berland is another example of what I term the excesses of Hasidism related to the cult of personality. I have been urged by a few people to make some statement on this matter via my blog. As a response to this urging, I will enumerate my concerns.

Hyehudi’s Deterministic Historiography

A WORLD WITHOUT JEWS

An exhilarating new intellectual history argues that anti-Judaism is at the heart of Western culture

February 13, 2013 • 7:00 AM

The title of David Nirenberg’s new book, Anti-Judaism: The Western Tradition, uses a term pointedly different from the one we are used to. The hatred and oppression of Jews has been known since the late 19th century as anti-Semitism—a label, it is worth remembering, originally worn with pride by German Jew-haters. What is the difference, then, between anti-Semitism and anti-Judaism? The answer, as it unfolds in Nirenberg’s scholarly tour de force, could be summarized this way: Anti-Semitism needs actual Jews to persecute; anti-Judaism can flourish perfectly well without them since its target is not a group of people but an idea.

Nirenberg’s thesis is that this idea of Judaism, which bears only a passing resemblance to Judaism as practiced and lived by Jews, has been at the very center of Western civilization since the beginning. From Ptolemaic Egypt to early Christianity, from the Catholic Middle Ages to the Protestant Reformation, from the Enlightenment to fascism, whenever the West has wanted to define everything it is not—when it wants to put a name to its deepest fears and aversions—Judaism has been the name that came most easily to hand. “Anti-Judaism,” Nirenberg summarizes, “should not be understood as some archaic or irrational closet in the vast edifices of Western thought. It was rather one of the basic tools with which that edifice was constructed.”

This is a pretty depressing conclusion, especially for Jews destined to live inside that edifice; but the intellectual journey Nirenberg takes to get there is exhilarating. Each chapter of “Anti-Judaism” is devoted to an era in Western history and the particular kinds of anti-Judaism it fostered. Few if any of these moments are new discoveries; indeed, Nirenberg’s whole argument is that certain types of anti-Judaism are so central to Western culture that we take them for granted. What Nirenberg has done is to connect these varieties of anti-Judaism into a convincing narrative, working with original sources to draw out the full implications of seminal anti-Jewish writings.

The main reason why Judaism, and therefore anti-Judaism, have been so central to Western culture is, of course, Christianity. But Nirenberg’s first chapter shows that some persistent anti-Jewish tropes predate Jesus by hundreds of years. The Greek historian Hecataeus of Abdera, writing around 320 BCE, recorded an Egyptian tradition that inverts the familiar Exodus story. In this version, the Hebrews did not escape from Egypt but were expelled as an undesirable element, “strangers dwelling in their midst and practicing different rites.” These exiles settled in Judea under the leadership of Moses, who instituted for them “an unsocial and intolerant mode of life.” Already, Nirenberg observes, we can detect “what would become a fundamental concept of anti-Judaism—Jewish misanthropy.” This element was emphasized by a somewhat later writer, an Egyptian priest named Manetho, who described the Exodus as the revolt of an impious group of “lepers and other unclean people.”

As he will do throughout the book, Nirenberg describes these anti-Jewish texts not in a spirit of outrage or condemnation, but rather of inquiry. The question they raise is not whether the ancient Israelites were “really” lepers, but rather, why later Egyptian writers claimed they were. What sort of intellectual work did anti-Judaism perform in this particular culture? To answer the question, Nirenberg examines the deep history of Egypt, showing how ruptures caused by foreign invasion and religious innovation came to be associated with the Jews. Then he discusses the politics of Hellenistic Egypt, in which a large Jewish population was sandwiched uneasily between the Greek elite and the Egyptian masses. In a pattern that would be often repeated, this middle position left the Jews open to hostility from both sides, which would erupt into frequent riots and massacres. In the long term, Nirenberg writes, “the characteristics of misanthropy, impiety, lawlessness, and universal enmity that ancient Egypt assigned to Moses and his people would remain available to later millennia: a tradition made venerable by antiquity, to be forgotten, rediscovered, and put to new uses by later generations of apologists and historians.”

With his chapters on Saint Paul and the early church, Nirenberg begins to navigate the headwaters of European anti-Judaism. Paul, whose epistles instructed small Christian communities in the Near East on points of behavior and doctrine, was writing at a time when Christianity was still primarily a Jewish movement. In his desire to emphasize the newness of his faith, and the rupture with Judaism that Jesus Christ represented, he cast the two religions as a series of oppositions. Where Jews read scripture according to the “letter,” the literal meaning, Christians read it according to the “spirit,” as an allegory predicting the coming of Christ. Likewise, where Jews obeyed traditional laws, Christians were liberated from them by faith in Christ—which explained why Gentile converts to Christianity did not need to follow Jewish practices like circumcision. To “Judaize,” to use a word Paul coined, meant to be a prisoner of this world, to believe in the visible rather than the invisible, the superficial appearance rather than the true meaning, law rather than love. More than a theological error, Judaism was an error in perception and cognition, a fundamentally wrong way of being in the world.

The problem, as Nirenberg argues in the richest sections of his book, is that this is an error to which Christians themselves are highly prone. Paul and the early Christians lived in the expectation of the imminent end of the world, the return of Christ, and the establishment of the new Jerusalem. As the end kept on not coming, it became necessary to construct a Christian way of living in this world. But this meant that Christians would have need of law and letter, too, that they would need to “Judaize” to some degree.

That is why the theological debates in the early church, leading up to Saint Augustine, were often cast as arguments about Judaizing. Marcion, a 2nd-century-CE heretic, followed Paul’s denigration of “the letter” to the point of discarding the entire Old Testament (as the Hebrew Bible was now known); to keep reading Jewish scriptures was to miss the point of Christ’s radical newness. On the other hand, Justin Martyr, Marcion’s orthodox opponent, believed that this reduction of the Old Testament to its merely literal content was itself a way of repeating a “Jewish” error. In other words, both Marcion and Justin each accused the other of Judaizing, of reading and thinking like a Jew. This, too, would become a pattern for subsequent Christian (and post-Christian) history: If Judaism was an error, every error could potentially be thought of as Jewish. “This struggle to control the power of ‘Judaism,’ ” Nirenberg writes, “will turn out to be one of the most persistent and explosive themes of Christian political theology, from the Middle Ages to Modernity.”

With the rise of Catholic polities in the Middle Ages, anti-Judaism took on a less theological, more material cast. In countries like England, France, and Germany, the Jews held a unique legal status as the king’s “servants” or “slaves,” which put them outside the usual chain of feudal relationships. This allowed Jews to play a much-needed but widely loathed role in finance and taxation, while also demonstrating the unique power of the monarch. The claim of the Capet dynasty to be kings of France, Nirenberg shows, rested in part on their claim to control the status of the Jews, a royal prerogative and a lucrative one: King after king plundered “his” Jews when in need of cash. At the same time, being the public face of royal power left the Jews exposed to the hatred of the people at large. Riots against Jews and ritual murder accusations became popular ways of demonstrating dissatisfaction with the government. When medieval subjects wanted to protest against their rulers, they would often accuse the king of being in league with the Jews, or even a Jew himself.

The common thread in Anti-Judaism is that such accusations of Jewishness have little to do with actual Jews. They are a product of a Gentile discourse, in which Christians argue with other Christians by accusing them of Judaism. The same principle holds true in Nirenberg’s fascinating later chapters. When Martin Luther rebelled against Catholicism, he attacked the church’s “legalistic understanding of God’s justice” as Jewish: “In this sense the Roman church had become more ‘Jewish’ than the Jews.” When the Puritan revolutionaries in the English Civil War thought about the ideal constitution for the state, they looked to the ancient Israelite commonwealth as described in Judges and Kings.

Surprisingly, Nirenberg shows, the decline of religion in Europe and the rise of the Enlightenment did little to change the rhetoric of anti-Judaism. Voltaire, Kant, and Hegel all used Judaism as a figure for what they wanted to overcome—superstition, legalistic morality, the dead past. Finally, in a brief concluding chapter on the 19th century and after, Nirenberg shows how Marx recapitulated ancient anti-Jewish tropes when he conceived of communist revolution as “the emancipation of mankind from Judaism”—that is, from money and commerce and social alienation. And this is not to mention some of Nirenberg’s most striking chapters, including one on the role of Judaism in early Islam and one devoted to a close reading of Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice.

Nirenberg has a sure grasp of a huge variety of historical and intellectual contexts, and, unlike many historians, he is able to write elegantly and clearly about complex topics. Not until the very end of Anti-Judaism does he touch, obliquely, on the question of what this ancient intellectual tradition means for Jews today. But as he suggests, the genealogy that connects contemporary anti-Zionism with traditional anti-Judaism is clear: “We live in an age in which millions of people are exposed daily to some variant of the argument that the challenges of the world they live in are best explained in terms of ‘Israel.’ ” For all the progress the world has made since the Holocaust in thinking rationally about Jews and Judaism, the story Nirenberg has to tell is not over. Anyone who wants to understand the challenges of thinking and living as a Jew in a non-Jewish culture should read Anti-Judaism.

From Tablet, here.