‘Was Rabbi S.R. Hirsch Against Kabbalah?’ – REBUTTAL by Boruch Clinton

Boruch Clinton:

Hyehudi Editor:

By the way, on the topic you raise of Rabbi Hirsch’s view of Kabbala, you may be interested in my own treatment here.”

Boruch Clinton:

I read and enjoyed your article. I do have a couple of thoughts:

The “ethical side” of Judaism versus the “mystical, extramundane side”? False Dichotomy!

I wouldn’t characterize the difference as “ethical” vs “mystical” – in the sense that the mystical side admitted to no ethical elements at all.

Instead, I feel strongly that the Tzfas innovation added theurgic elements that, until that point, were largely non-existent. But, as you correctly note, they were also perfectly comfortable with ethical teachings.
However, R’ Hirsch is quite firm in his rejection of the theurgic impulse. And those passages in Nineteen Letters are not the only places where he makes this clear. I’m not sure how someone could argue that Hirsch approved keeping mitzvos even partially for self-serving goals.
I recently came across a debate between the Tur and the Bais Yosef (Ohr Chaim 61) that I believe illustrates the schism (I write about it in this article: see the section called “The Fault Line”). The Tur presented three reasons that saying “Kel melech na’aman” before Shema is forbidden. The Bais Yosef acknowledged the problems, but responded (in part) with the claim that we say those words in the expectation that they will bring refuah to all 248 of our avarim. I have absolutely no doubt which side of this argument Hirsch would accept.

In a weaker example, Mesilas Yesharim is reportedly a summary of Ramchal’s ideas, too.

I actually addressed that rumor in an article last summer. While Ramchal was undeniably an enthusiastic kabbalist (to put it mildly), I’m convinced that his Mesilas Yesharim was free of even the most obscure hints.

The Gra famously said the Arizal’s words, too, were intended as Meshalim (according to Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin). Rabbi Yehuda Leib Ashlag had a famous running disagreement with his contemporaries about our role in deciphering these parables (אכמ”ל).

That’s fair. But there are limits to how far it goes. As I wrote (in the context of how R’ Chaim Vital – as quoted by Nefesh HaChaim – represented עצמות השם):

“As a rule, one uses a metaphor to obscure a deep idea within a seemingly innocuous text, making the truth available only to initiates. But knowing that the text will also be read by countless outsiders, one would be wise to choose a metaphor that’s truly harmless. Why, however, would anyone couch his ideas within an outer metaphor that not only expresses the exact opposite of what he’s teaching, but stands opposed to the very core of Jewish belief? And, in addition, why use a metaphor that’s not in the least obscure – leaving no clear hint that there’s anything deeper to find beneath the surface?”

Kabbalists, too, forever complain of being misunderstood. The Noda Beyehuda responsum against reciting “Leshem Yichud” is also saying Kabbalah is being “misconstrued”. Come on, is the Noda Beyehuda a Kabbalah reductionist, too?!

Why not? I think it’s reasonable to take him at his word.

But as to R’ Hirsch himself, as you note, he never rejected Zohar itself. But I haven’t been able to find any reading of his actual words that suggests he had any room for the *Tzfas interpretation of Zohar etc.
Hyehudi Editor:
May I publish your email as a rebuttal to my article?
While you do make good points, however, my opinion is unchanged.
I don’t intend on responding.
Boruch Clinton:
That’s a great idea. I think presenting conflicting opinions side-by-side helps everyone achieve clarity.

Note: I did not see his article (undated) before writing my own.