An old article Arutz Sheva failed to spike by Shimon Cohen & Mordechai Sones (h/t Chananya Weissman).
Excerpt:
More than four decades later, Israel is still occupied with national soul searching regarding the 1973 Yom Kippur War, which ended in victory, but claimed 2,656 Israeli lives and left an enduring scar in the national psyche, coming only six years after the miraculous Six Day War. It is now known that then US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger prevented Prime Minister Golda Meir from calling up the reserves although he knew the war would break out, that the Intelligence Services failed to warn of impending war and that Israel was perilously close to defeat in the first few days. It is also known that at that point Moshe Dayan wanted to prepare for the use of nuclear weapons, but Golda Meir disagreed and then the tide of the war turned. Meir and Dayan resigned after the war and the Agranat Committee of Inquiry was set up to investigate the unjustified complacency and lack of preparedness that led to the loss of so many lives.
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Cohen continued: “Later on, the name Joe Alon was mentioned as someone who revealed a document in which Kissinger and Dayan allegedly signed an agreement that would give the Syrians and Egyptians a small victory that might take the lives of 200 to 300 Israeli soldiers, but that Arab national pride would be restored, after which they would agree to sign a peace agreement for thousands of years. Dayan thought it worthwhile, he felt that the cost was the worth it. This was the same Dayan who visited Tel Fares 11 days before the war and declared ‘there will be war’.”
Cohen adds that while in a “fixed” soccer game, those who rig it are put in jail, “in this case there were thousands who were sold out, when they thought they would sell out 300, and I am one of those few who were there. They just sold us. General Hofi was shocked and said he’d heard rumors, but Peled openly said that it had already been delivered. Hofi told us that Gorodish (the new and inexperienced commander of the southern front, later blamed for the initial failure and high casualties, ed.) was visiting the Northern Command and told him that there had been an organizational overhaul: There were no tanks on the ramps as per regulation, oil taps intended to ignite the canal in the case of an Egyptian crossing were not opened, and mines that were supposed to block the Egyptians had been blown up earlier. In other words, the Egyptians were given absolute autonomy to cross the canal and kill our soldiers so that they could reach the target of overrunning seven kilometers east of the [Suez] canal.”